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Abstract 
 
In 1995, when contagion from the tequila crisis was spreading in Latin America, both Chile and 
Colombia were exempt from contagion and presented high rates of economic growth. Several analysts 
attribute this positive performance to the fact that both had undertaken prudential measures to avoid 
excessive exposure to short term capital flows and pressures towards excessive real exchange rate 
appreciation: Both countries were using a reserve requirement on short term foreign indebtedness, crawling-
bands, and other instruments for reducing domestic vulnerability to capital flows.  
The parallelism between Chile and Colombia continued after the Asian crisis. In this period, despite 
the fact that short-term liabilities represented only a small share of foreign debt in both countries, 
vulnerability to the international financial crisis was high. In both, real interest rates rose sharply in 1998 and 
GDP growth was negative in 1999. 
  The similarities between Chile and Colombia, however, do not go much farther. During the 1990s, 
GDP growth rates were very high in Chile while in Colombia they were below historical standards. Chile had 
fiscal surpluses and high private savings, while in Colombia there was a rapidly increasing fiscal deficit and 
falling domestic savings. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the macroeconomic policies of Chile 
and Colombia during the 1990s, in particular the exchange rate regimes, the capital account regulations, and 





The management of real macroeconomic balances has shown to be a significant variable 
in explaining the growth performance and behavior of productive investment in emerging 
economies (EEs).  In the present stage of globalization of financial volatility, capital flows have 
played a crucial role for the sustainability of those balances and their interplay with growth 
(Ffrench-Davis, 2004; Ocampo, 2004).  Here we examine the macroeconomic policies 
implemented by Chile and Colombia since 1990, the successes and failures achieved, focussing 
in growth performance and macroeconomic sustainability. 
 
In 1995, when contagion from the tequila crisis was spreading to almost all countries in 
Latin America, Chile and Colombia were exempt from contagion and presented high rates of 
growth in that year, without significant signs of financial distress. Many analysts attribute this 
positive performance, to a large degree, to the fact that both countries had undertaken prudential 
measures in order to avoid 'excessive' exposure to short term capital flows. In particular, both 
countries were at that time using a reserve requirement on short term foreign indebtedness and 
several other instruments addressed to reduce domestic vulnerability to capital flows. Also, 
authorities in Chile and Colombia had effectively worked against the pressures of capital inflows 
towards excessive real appreciation of their domestic currencies. 
 
The parallelism between Chile and Colombia continued to be present after the Asian and 
the Russian crises of 1997 and 1998. In this period, however, the results were not so positive. 
The central banks of both countries had been intervening in the foreign exchange markets 
through crawling currency bands for many years. In 1998, those bands became strait jackets from 
which it was extremely difficult to get rid of without losing credibility and without exposing the 
foreign exchange markets to destabilizing dynamics. Despite the fact that short-term debt 
represented only a small share of total foreign liabilities in both countries, vulnerability to the 
international financial crisis was significant in those years, real interest rates rose sharply in 1998 
and GDP growth was negative in 1999. 
 
The similarities between Chile and Colombia, however, do not go much farther. During 
most of the decade, Chile presented very high fiscal surpluses and saving and GDP growth rates 
rose significantly, while in Colombia GDP growth was below historical records, the public sector 
deficit increased rapidly, and saving rates followed a decreasing trend. 
 
Thus, the macroeconomic outcomes of Chile and Colombia were quite different, but still 
their response to the international financial crises of 1995 and 1998-99 shared several common 
elements. This may be due to the fact that both countries used similar instruments to regulate 
capital inflows and foreign exchange markets. This makes the comparative analysis of the two 
economies particularly attractive. 
 
Section 1 is aimed to provide an overview of the macroeconomic frameworks of Chile 
and Colombia during the 1990s. Section 2 follows the evolution of exchange rate regimes. 









1. Macroeconomic environments of Chile and Colombia during the 1990s 
1 
 
a)  Inflation and economic activity  
 
  Chile and Colombia had, before the 1990s, a long tradition of relatively high inflation 
rates, which created strong inertia in the price setting processes. The CPI annual inflation rates 
were quite similar in both countries during the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1989, they averaged 
20.7% in the Chilean case and 22.5% in Colombia (table 1). During the 1990s, the central banks 
-which were quite autonomous- adopted very similar institutional policies, and tried to avoid 
shock treatments and rather chose a gradual approach to the process of disinflation. The large 
capital inflows that dominated most of the period created pressures towards the appreciation of 
domestic currencies and helped the central banks in the process of reducing inflation. However, 
neither of these countries used exchange rate anchoring in order to reduce inflation. In the early 
1990s, the inflation rate started a steady process of reduction, which was more rapid in Chile –
this country reached one digit inflation rates in 1994, while Colombia did it in 1999.  
 
Notwithstanding the similarities in monetary policy, there were deep differences in the 
behavior of economic activity in Chile and Colombia during the 1990s.  The Chilean economy 
had suffered a deep crisis in 1982-83 -with a 14% drop in GDP and a severe financial crisis- 
which generated a large gap between effective and potential GDP, discouraging capital 
formation and the growth of potential GDP. In 1986, actual GDP started to recover, and the gap 
initiated a gradual reduction trend until it disappeared in 1989. Between 1990 and 1997, both 
effective and potential GDP grew vigorously, with an average yearly rate of 7.6%. Dynamism of 
the economy slowed down in 1998, and a 0.8% drop in GDP was observed in 1999. Since 2000, 
growth resumed at a rate far below the levels that were observed before 1998
2 In any case, the 
yearly average in 1990-2003 was 5.5% (table 1)  –it doubled the 2.9% recorded in 1974-89, the 
sixteen year period of the Pinochet regime (Ffrench-Davis, 2002, ch. 1).  
 
Colombia also experienced a boom by the mid-1990s but it was much milder and shorter 
than in Chile. Colombian GDP growth averaged 5.3% yearly between 1993 and 1995. For the 
rest of the 1990s, it was well below the historical standards. The annual GDP growth rate in 
1990-2003 averaged only 2.7%. Even during the period of the Latin-American debt crisis, 
Colombia had attained a higher average growth rate. Moreover, the recession in 1999, with a 
drop of 4.2%, was much deeper than in Chile and the recovery in more recent years has been 
slower. As a result, per capita GDP in 2003 was at the level of 1994 and 5% below 1997, 
mirroring a significant output gap.  
 
                                           
1 The table in the Preface shows the relative sizes of both countries: Colombia has a population and a GDP at current 
prices 2.9 times and 1.3 times those of Chile, respectively, but a GDP per capita that is only 2/3 that of Chile and 1/6 
that of the USA (at World Bank PPP prices). 
2 It is estimated that potential GDP grew 7% until the arrival of the negative shock brought by the Asian Crisis, and 




























b) Fiscal  balances 
 
  The outstanding behavior of economic activity in Chile during most of the 1990s took 
place in an environment of fiscal surpluses. Until 1997, there was a fiscal surplus of 2% of GDP 
in average and the central government expenditure as a share of GDP was relatively constant –at 
around 20% (table 2).  Since 1998, government expenditure rose gradually by three percentage 
points of GDP, reflecting increases in social expenditure as well as a counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy. Even so, the deficits of both the central government and the consolidated non-financial 
public sector were very moderate, notwithstanding the tax revenue foregone due to a gap 
between effective and potential GDP and a depressed price of copper.
3 
 
In contrast with Chile, the poor performance of economic activity in Colombia along the 
1990s coincided with an unprecedented increase in government expenditure and fiscal deficits. 
Central government expenditure, that before 1990 had been close merely to 10% of GDP for 
more than three decades, increased to 21% in 2001-03 (similar to the Chilean level). Several 
analysts have attributed this unprecedented increase in public spending to the Constitutional 
reform of 1991, which accelerated the process of fiscal decentralization and incorporated into the 
Constitution new citizens rights that should be covered with public resources. In addition, the 
transition from the pay-as-you-go system towards a pension regime based on individual 
capitalization accounts implied, as it had done in Chile in the 1980s, a huge increase in 
government expenditure as measured by cash flows, although it contributed to reduce the 
                                           
3 Since 2000 the government has been working with a scheme of structural fiscal budget estimated with a "normal" 
price of copper and tax proceeds as if actual  GDP were equal to the "potential" GDP. 
CPI Inflation Rate GDP Growth Rate CPI Inflation Rate GDP Growth Rate
1974-81 98.9% 3.3% 24.6% 4.6%
1982-89 20.7% 2.6% 22.5% 3.4%
1990 27.3% 3.7% 32.4% 4.3%
1991 18.7% 8.0% 26.8% 2.0%
1992 12.7% 12.3% 25.1% 4.0%
1993 12.2% 7.0% 22.6% 5.4%
1994 8.9% 5.7% 22.6% 5.1%
1995 8.2% 10.6% 19.5% 5.2%
1996 6.6% 7.4% 21.6% 2.1%
1997 6.0% 6.6% 17.7% 3.4%
1998 4.7% 3.2% 16.7% 0.6%
1999 2.3% -0.8% 9.2% -4.2%
2000 4.5% 4.5% 8.8% 2.9%
2001 2.6% 3.4% 7.7% 1.4%
2002
 
 p  2.8% 2.2% 7.0% 1.6%
2003 p 1.1% 3.3% 6.5% 3.7%
Average
1990-2003
8.5% 5.5% 17.2% 2.7%
p/ Preliminary
CHILE AND COLOMBIA: 
Source: Chile : Central Bank of Chile.  Colombia: DANE.
TABLE 1
CPI INFLATION AND GDP GROWTH RATES, 1974-2003
CHILE COLOMBIA





actuarial debt. The absence of an equivalent increase in public revenues implied that the central 
government fiscal deficit rose from less than 1% of GDP in the early 1990s to almost 6% of GDP 
between 1999 and 2002. In turn, the consolidated non-financial public sector, which had a 
surplus until 1994, presents a deficit close to 4% of GDP since 1999.   
 
 
c) Savings  and  investment 
 
  The contrasting performance of economic activity and fiscal accounts in Chile and 
Colombia implied a very different behavior of savings and investment (table 3). With an 
economy persistently operating at full employment of installed capacity, high rates of GDP 
growth and outstanding fiscal surpluses, savings and investment rates in the Chilean case were in 
the 1990s notably above historical standards. Fixed capital formation reached historical peaks in 
the 1990s, averaging 28.5% in 1991-98 (in 1986 prices). This figure contrasts with 19.9% during 
the last quinquenium of the Pinochet era (1985-89) and with an even lower average in the prior 
years. Although the crisis of 1999 implied a significant decline in investment, fixed capital 
formation between 1999 and 2003 was still well above its average level in the 1980s. 
Chile Colombia Chile Colombia Chile Colombia 
1990 20.2% 9.8% 0.8% -0.9% 1.2% -0.6%
1991 20.6% 10.9% 1.5% -0.4% 1.5% 0.0%
1992 20.3% 12.6% 2.1% -1.8% 2.5% -0.2%
1993 20.5% 12.3% 1.8% -0.7% 2.1% 0.3%
1994 19.9% 12.8% 1.6% -1.4% 1.9% 0.1%
1995 18.6% 13.6% 2.4% -2.2% 2.4% -0.3%
1996 19.6% 15.7% 2.1% -3.6% 1.6% -1.7%
1997 19.9% 16.3% 1.8% -3.8% 0.8% -3.3%
1998 21.3% 17.0% 0.4% -4.9% -0.6% -3.7%
1999 22.6% 19.2% -1.4% -5.9% -1.5% -4.1%
2000 22.4% 19.2% 0.1% -5.9% -0.6% -4.2%
2001 22.9% 21.3% -0.3% -5.9% -0.6% -4.4%
2002 p 22.9% 21.4% -0.6% -5.6% -1.6% -3.6%
2003 p 22.4% 21.1% -0.8% -5.0% -3.0%
p/ Preliminary
2/ Does not include privatizations
1/ GDP figures at current pesos have been adjusted to make old data compatible with the methodology





Surplus (+) or Deficit (-)
 2
Non-Financial Public Sector  
Surplus (+) or Deficit (-) 
2
CHILE AND COLOMBIA:  GOVERMENT EXPENDITURE AND DEFICIT, 1990-2003
(Shares of GDP in current pesos)
 1
Source:  Chile: Dirección de Presupuesto (DIPRES) and Central Bank of Chile. Colombia: DNP - CONFIS (Cash 





Fixed investment in Colombia presented large swings, with a significant increase until the 
mid-1990s and a rapid decline thereafter. However, even during the boom period, between 1993 
and 1995, the Colombian ratios of fixed capital formation were much lower than in Chile. After 
the crisis, since 1999, fixed investment experienced a dramatic drop and stayed below 15% of 
GDP. These low levels of investment will make it much more difficult for Colombia to recover 
high and sustainable rates of economic growth in the near future. 
 
  The Colombian savings rates plummeted dramatically during the 1990s. They went down 
by about four percentage points of GDP between the late 1980s and mid-1990s and by nearly 
eight additional points during the second half of the decade. In the Chilean case, in contrast, in 
the 1990s the savings ratios were systematically higher than in the 1980s. 
 
 
A.  CHILE Constant prices of 1986 Constant prices of  1996 Methodology 1986







1996 31.0% 26.4% 21.2% 23.1%
1997 32.2% 27.4% 21.6% 23.1%
1998 32.2% 27.0% 21.2% 21.8%
1999 26.9% 22.2% 21.8% 21.0%
2000 26.6% 23.2% 21.9% 20.6%
2001 23.2% 20.5%
2002 p 23.0% 20.6%
2003 p 23.4% 21.0%
B. COLOMBIA Constant prices of 1975 Constant prices of 1994 Methodology 1975
1985 - 1989 15.8% 21.5%
1990 14.0% 21.4%
1991 12.9% 22.7%
1992 13.9% 17.9% 19.0%
1993 18.0% 21.8% 19.5%
1994 20.7% 23.3% 18.6% 23.0%
1995 20.2% 22.3% 16.9% 23.0%






2002 p 14.4% 14.7% 1/
2003 p 15.7% 15.1% 1/
Source:  Chile:  Central Bank of Chile and IMF-IFS.  Colombia:  DANE -DNP
p/ Preliminary.




GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(Shares of GDP at constant prices)
CHILE AND COLOMBIA:  INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS, 1985-2003
(Shares of GDP)
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS





d) Financial  sector 
 
An outstanding contrast between Chile and Colombia during the 1990s has to do with the 
behavior of the financial sector. In Colombia, the reduction in domestic saving rates and the rise 
in investment during the first half of the decade were accompanied by an impressive financial 
boom, which was to a large degree fed with capital inflows (Barajas and Steiner, 2002). 
Outstanding credit of the financial sector rose from around 24% of GDP at the beginning of the 
decade to 40% in 1997. During the subsequent crisis this figure went down dramatically, back to 
25%, while the quality of the portfolio of the financial system deteriorated substantially (table 4).  
 
In the Chilean case, the degree of financial depth was much higher than in Colombia 
since the beginning of the 1990s and continued to be so after the crisis. In addition, in contrast 
with most other Latin American countries, the index of credit/GDP behaved counter-cyclically.
4 
This helped to explain the fact that the deterioration of quality of the loan portfolio during the 
crisis was extremely mild. While non-performing loans as a share of outstanding credit reached 
11% in Colombia in 1999, they did not surpass 1.8% in Chile.
5 One main reason behind this 
strength of the Chilean financial system is the strict prudential supervision, built after the 
generalized collapse of the banking sector in 1983-86 as a result of the debt crisis.  
 
                                           
4 In a comparative study for the eight largest Latin American economies, Barajas and Steiner (2002) show that the 
Chilean case was exceptional in this respect. 
5 There is heterogeneity in the definition of non-performing loans. In Chile it refers to the installments of loans 
overdue for more than 90 days. In Colombia, the definition changed several times along the 1990s.  
1990 52.4% 24.8% 2.1% 4.0%
1991 48.7% 22.7% 1.8% 4.2%
1992 51.5% 24.4% 1.2% 3.1%
1993 55.7% 28.4% 0.8% 2.1%
1994 52.8% 31.9% 1.0% 2.4%
1995 55.4% 35.5% 0.9% 3.7%
1996 59.5% 37.3% 1.0% 5.1%
1997 64.3% 39.6% 1.0% 5.2%
1998 66.8% 37.8% 1.4% 8.7%
1999 69.2% 33.9% 1.7% 11.5%
2000 69.2% 27.1% 1.7% 9.4%
2001 69.7% 25.5% 1.6% 8.6%
2002 68.2% 24.8% 1.8% 8.0%
2003 67.2% 25.0% 1.6% 5.7%
1/ Outstanding credit data does not include leasing transactions. 
Source: Chile:Central Bank of Chile, Banks and Financial Institutions 
Superintendence. Colombia: Banco de la República.
TABLE 4
CHILE AND COLOMBIA:  FINANCIAL SECTOR, 1990-2003










In summary, the cycle in foreign capital inflows was leveraged in Colombia by the 
behavior of domestic credit, which was not the case in Chile. Together with the stricter 
supervision of the financial sector in the Chilean case, two other factors may have contributed to 
these contrasting results. First, in Colombia the boom of capital inflows coincided with a reform 
in the financial sector, which implied that the central bank undertook an important reduction in 
the reserve requirements on domestic deposits between 1991 and 1998. Thus, as stressed by 
Carrasquilla and Zárate (2002), domestic financial regulation in Colombia was highly pro-
cyclical. Second, the higher degree of financial depth may have worked in the Chilean case as a 
buffer against the capital inflows shock. This hypothesis would endorse the idea that foreign 
capital account regulations are even more important when the domestic financial system is less 
developed.  
 
e)  Foreign savings and the current account 
 
In the Chilean case, probably as a consequence of very active regulations on capital 
inflows, the current account deficit was kept under control during the first half of the decade. In 
1993, due to a sharp drop in the copper prices, the deficit went up to 5.4% of GDP. However, the 
current account deficits were below 3% of GDP, averaging 2.3% between 1990 and 1995 (figure 
1). After the tequila crisis, the current account deficits rose to less sustainable levels, close to 5% 
of GDP between 1996 and 1998. As shown later, this coincides with the period in which the 
regulation of capital inflows became less active. 
 
Figure 1 
CHILE AND COLOMBIA: CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF 





























In Colombia, in contrast, the deterioration of the current account was particularly acute 
during the first half of the decade. Between 1991 and 1994 –coinciding with a process of trade 
opening, currency appreciation and capital flows liberalization– a current account surplus of 
4.9% of GDP was transformed into a deficit of 4.5%, level around which it remained until 1998. 
 
The drop in international liquidity after the Asian and the Russian crises implied drastic 
adjustments in the current account deficits. In 1999, such adjustments represented 5.0% and 
5.7% of GDP in Chile and Colombia, respectively. As shown in the next section, the paths 
followed by the current account balances of Chile and Colombia during the 1990s were matched 
by the behavior of their real exchange rates. 
 
 
2. Exchange rate regimes 
 
During most of the 1990s, the exchange rate regimes of Chile and Colombia were dominated by 
the currency bands, which in both countries were dismantled and replaced by floating regimes 
only in 1999. Those regimes shared many common elements. 
 
a)  Chilean exchange rate regime 
 
After the crisis of 1982-83, and much earlier than Colombia, Chile introduced a minor 
width currency band. Since the beginning, the upper and the lower bounds of the band were 
devalued daily, according to an estimate of net inflation. Discrete nominal devaluations, 
however, were added at various junctures, serving to achieve the notable real depreciation of 
130% between 1982 and 1988. In 1989 the band was widened to ±5%, allowing for an orderly 
and not traumatic depreciation of the peso, which was required to compensate for the rise in 
imports associated to a sharp increase in economic activity in 1988-89. 
 
The evolution of the foreign exchange regime since 1990 reflected the purpose of the 
central bank to regulate the surge in capital inflows. Since June 1991, as we will see in the next 
section, an unremunerated reserve requirement was established on foreign loans, and a tax on 
domestic loans applied to up to one year of each operation was extended to foreign loans. In 
January 1992, the currency band was widened to ±10%. In contrast with what had happened 
three years earlier, the widening of the band in this case was addressed to allow for some 
additional appreciation of the peso. In June 1992, the dollar was replaced by a basket of 
currencies as the standard for the exchange rate. Replacing the dollar with the basket meant 
greater stability for the real exchange rate as perceived by producers of tradables, and introduced 
greater uncertainty in the peso-dollar exchange rate, thereby reducing incentives for interest rate 
arbitrage and short-term capital movements (Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2001, p. 87). Remember 
that, by this time, capital inflows were very large and it was already clear that the Chilean 
economy was booming. As we will see in the next section, the objective of deterring interest rate 
arbitrage was being simultaneously addressed through the reserve requirement on capital 
inflows, thus providing space for an active counter-cyclical monetary policy. In the following 





(averaging 1% yearly between 1989 and 1995).
6 Consistently, as said, the current account deficit 
between 1990 and 1995 averaged only 2.3% of GDP.
 7 
 
Following the tequila crisis, the behavior of the Chilean economy was so strong that 
expectations of appreciation and capital inflows were greatly reinforced after 1995. The central 
bank kept accumulating significant amounts of international reserves with the exchange rate at 
the then appreciating bottom of the band, until the end of 1997. Several parameters of the band 
were adjusted during that period in order to allow for some additional appreciation of the peso 
and to reduce monetary pressures from the accumulation of foreign reserves. Since November 
1995, the rate of nominal depreciation of the band was designed to allow for a 2 percent real 
appreciation per year, based on the assumption that Chilean productivity growth would be faster 
than that of its trading partners. In addition, the external inflation used to calculate the referential 
exchange rate was overestimated, which generated considerable additional revaluation. 
Furthermore, in early 1997, the band was broadened from ±10% to ±12.5% as a mechanism to 
allow for further appreciation of the peso and served to reduce inflation (see Ffrench-Davis and 
Tapia, 2001, pp. 95-96). As a consequence, the peso appreciated 20% in real terms between 
March 1995 and October 1997, notably faster than before the tequila crisis (figure 2). 
 
 
                                           
6 Central Bank figures provide a higher estimate of appreciation --an annual average of 2.5%-- because it uses whole 
price indexes for measuring external inflation. We use figures of ECLAC that measure external inflation on the basis 
of CPI. This procedure is consistent with that of Colombia.  
7 Appreciation of the real rate was "equilibrating" in the sense that it was consistent with the net increases of 
productivity in Chile, as the sustainable external deficit suggests. Keeping a low current account deficit was among 
the explicit objectives of the exchange rate policy of the Central Bank in that period (see Zahler, 1998). 
 
Source: ECLAC figures.
Average real exchange rate with main trading partners, computed with CPI.  A higher real exchange rate indicates a more deppreciated 
domestic currency.
FIGURE 1
CHILE AND COLOMBIA: REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEX, 1987-2003















































































































































































When the exchange rate expectations shifted to depreciation, in late 1997, following the 
Asian crisis, the Central Bank started to sell abundant reserves to avoid a depreciation of the 
exchange rate even within the lower half of the exchange rate band in order to prevent a rise in 
inflation. The anti-inflationary bias of the Central Bank interventions in the foreign exchange 
market became even more evident in mid-1998, when the band was drastically shortened, right at 
the moment of greatest uncertainty, in order to send a signal that the authorities would not give in 
to market pressures towards devaluation. This measure implied that the macroeconomic 
adjustment process that was needed as a consequence of the drastic decline in the terms of trade 
and of the shortage of capital flows had to be led by interest rate hikes and monetary 
contraction.
8 Then, the strategy chosen by the authorities of the Bank was more consistent with a 
fixed exchange rate regime than with a currency band system. Naturally, credibility in the new 
band rapidly deteriorated. The band was widened again at the end of 1998 and then suspended in 
September 1999 in order to allow for the exchange rate to adjust freely, now in the context of 
strongly depressed domestic absorption (figure 3). 
 






                                           
8 The authorities of the Central Bank stated that an adjustment in the exchange rate would have caused both pressure 
on prices and costs associated to currency mismatches in large non-tradable firms. Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2001) 
point out that these effects were overrated and implied an over-adjustment in the productive sector. Corbo and 
Tessada (2002) estimate a VAR model for Chile and conclude that i) the defense of the exchange rate in January 
1998 was well justified by potential inflationary costs and, ii) however, a devaluation in mid-1998 would have not 
represented an inflationary risk.   
Figure 3


















Given the significant appreciation recorded in 1996-97, it was clear that the center of the 
band had become an "outlier" price, leaving no space within the band to make feasible the 
necessary exchange rate adjustment (Ffrench-Davis and Larraín, 2003). Actually, most of the 
depreciation in the real exchange rate in Chile in recent years took place after the dismantlement 
of the currency band in 1999. Between August 1999 and July 2003 the real exchange rate had 
depreciated by 30%. 
 
b)  Colombian exchange rate regime 
 
  As in Chile, the Colombian currency experienced a notable real devaluation during the 
1980s, which was required by the shortage of foreign savings. The devaluation of the peso was 
managed within the traditional crawling-peg regime that had been introduced since 1967 and 
lasted until 1991, and that, in contrast with Chile, avoided any discrete jump in the exchange 
rate. Even in 1985, when nominal devaluation was almost 50%, it was instrumented through 
small and continuous daily movements.  
 
In 1989, Colombia decided to depreciate its real exchange rate even further, in order to 
compensate for the decline in coffee prices after the collapse of the International Coffee 
Agreement and to prevent negative effects of the sharp opening up of the trade balance on the 
domestic production of tradables (Ocampo and Villar, 1992). However, this strategy rapidly 
proved to be inconsistent with the contractionary monetary policy that the central bank was 
trying to undertake in order to curb inflationary pressures. As in Chile, large capital inflows and 
pressures towards appreciation of the peso dominated during most of the 1990s, until mid-1997. 
Most of the adjustments in the Colombian exchange rate regime were introduced in order to 
manage those pressures.  
 
In June 1991, the traditional crawling-peg regime was modified. The Banco de la 
República would exchange dollars for “Certificados de Cambio” (dollar-denominated bonds) that 
could only be redeemed at the “official exchange rate” after a given maturity. The exchange rate 
would be determined by the secondary market for those bonds. The new regime, which was in 
place until January 1994, implied a nominal appreciation of the peso, which marked an important 
shift in the policy strategy that had been in place during almost a quarter of a century. During 
this period, there was a drastic relaxation in monetary policy addressed to reduce domestic 
interest rates and to discourage foreign capital inflows attracted by interest rate arbitrage. 
However, between 1991 and 1994, the real depreciation of the peso that had taken place in 1989 
and 1990 was entirely reversed (see figure 2 above). In January 1994, the Banco de la República 
decided to discontinue the mechanism of the “Certificados de Cambio” and introduced an 
explicit exchange rate band system (Urrutia, 1995). The amplitude of the band was set at ±7% 
and the center was increased every day at a predetermined crawling rate. In December 1994, 
however, the exchange rate band was shifted downwards as a consequence of the actual increase 
in long-term capital flows and of the expectations of additional inflows associated to the 
development of recently discovered oil camps (figure 4). 
 
The currency band established in December 1994 was kept without important changes 
until September 1998. During more than three years and a half, therefore, it helped to reduce the 





limit of the band helped to avoid an extreme depreciation during the first half of 1996, when 
there were speculative pressures related to the process against President Samper for allegedly 
illegal resources in his presidential campaign. Also, few months later, the lower bound of the 
band helped to avoid extreme appreciation of the peso when it became clear that President 
Samper would stay in office and large inflows were coming into the country, associated with the 
privatization of important public companies.  
 
After the Asian crisis had exploded, in the final months of 1997 and during the first half 
of 1998, the role of the currency band was much more controversial. The exchange rate had 
depreciated and was hitting the upper limit of the band, so the central bank was forced to sell 
large amounts of foreign exchange while implementing a highly contractive monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, due to the slope and of the amplitude of the band, the depreciation of the 
Colombian peso was quite substantial. The peso price of the dollar by mid-1998 had depreciated 
by about 8% in real terms, without any change in the currency band mechanism. The upward 
shift in the currency band was decided in September 1998, when a new government was in office 
and the macroeconomic program for 1999 had gained some credibility. After a short-lived 
overshooting, the new currency band worked smoothly during the last quarter of 1998 and the 
first quarter of 1999. The Central Bank stopped losing reserves and the domestic interest rate 
experienced a relatively rapid downward trend. 
 
Figure 4
COLOMBIA : Currency Bands and Nominal Exchange Rates,
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Source: Banco de la República. 
 
In the second quarter of 1999, the financial crisis, the deeper than expected recession and 
the further deterioration of the fiscal accounts, damaged the credibility in the macroeconomic 
program and new pressures towards devaluation appeared. In June, the band was again shifted 
upwards and its amplitude was widened from ±7% to ±10%. Simultaneously, the government 





to recover confidence from the international financial community. By late September, 
immediately after the agreement with the IMF was reached, the currency band was dismantled. 
Having been shifted twice in less than a year, its credibility had eroded. Also, at the international 
level, the initial success of other Latin-American countries with their new floating regimes 
(notably Brazil in February and Chile in early September) had created strong pressures against 
the band system, both in the market and in the multilateral financial institutions. This facilitated 
the appearance of speculative attacks. Most analysts however considered at that time, that the 
real exchange rate was already close to its long-run equilibrium level. Interestingly enough, this 
was verified ex-post de facto. Since the currency band was abolished, the exchange rate 
fluctuated inside the dismantled band during more than two years, despite a very rapid decline of 
the domestic interest rate (figure 4).  
 
Therefore, the real depreciation of the peso that took place as a consequence of the crisis 
was instrumented within the currency bands system.
9 Subsequently, between September 1999 
and May 2002, the real exchange rate fluctuated around the levels reached at that time. After 
May 2002, the contagion from the Brazilian crisis and a higher degree of uncertainty on the 
sustainability of the Colombian foreign debt, led to an additional real depreciation of the peso, 
which was reinforced by the end of the year with the effects of the Venezuelan crisis. 
 
Since the last quarter of 1999, Colombia has a floating exchange rate regime. Although 
this type of regime does not allow the central bank to target any specific nominal or real 
exchange rate, it contemplates two transparent and publicly known mechanisms for central bank 
intervention: (i) The central bank can buy or sell international reserves through put or call 
options that are auctioned in limited amounts of foreign exchange at the end of each month. This 
mechanism has been used mainly to buy international reserves and to recover the international 
liquidity indicators that Colombia had before the 1998/99 crisis. Since February 2003, however, 
given the rapid pace of depreciation, the Banco de la República has also used the call options in 
order to mitigate pressures on the exchange rate that may risk the attainment of the inflation 
target. (ii) The second mechanism is addressed to reduce extreme short-run volatility of the 
exchange rate and consists of additional auctions of put or call foreign exchange options which 
are triggered whenever the market rate deviates in an ‘unusual’ manner from its own 20-day 
moving average.
10 In practice, short-run volatility of the exchange rate has been low and these 
trigger conditions only took place in the second half of 2002, when contagion from the Brazilian 
crisis implied a rapid depreciation of the peso. 
 
c)  Common and contrasting elements of the exchange rate regimes in Chile and Colombia 
 
From the above description, it is possible to highlight some common and some 
contrasting features of the exchange rate regimes that Chile and Colombia had in the 1990s: 
 
(i)  During most of the 1990s, central bank interventions in both countries implied 
large amounts of international reserve accumulation. In this sense, the currency 
                                           
9 By the third quarter of 1999, before the currency band was dismantled, the real exchange rate had already 
recovered the levels of the late 1980s. 





bands worked as limits against appreciation of the exchange rate and not as anti-
inflationary devices.  
(ii)  As accumulation of international reserves, led by the capital surges to emerging 
economies, created monetary pressures and (short-run) quasi-fiscal costs of 
sterilizing monetary intervention, it became more difficult for the central banks to 
resist the market pressure for appreciation. Giving up to those pressures would 
contribute to keep inflation under control, so the currency bands were widened 
and shifted downwards in several opportunities, allowing for a sizeable 
appreciation of the real exchange rate during most of the decade in Colombia and 
in the second half in Chile. 
(iii)  The degree of flexibility of the foreign exchange market in the inner part of the 
bands proved to be much lower in Chile, where the central bank, with 
intramarginal intervention, was more active in trying to stabilize the exchange rate 
market than the Colombian one. This is mirrored in the fact that both the 
accumulation of international reserves during the boom and the losses during the 
crisis were much larger in Chile (see below, table 5).  
(iv)  In both countries, the limits of the currency bands seemed to be more effective to 
control pressures towards currency appreciation than towards currency 
depreciation. As the bands have an explicit or implicit pre-announcement of their 
limits, the exchange rate regime looses credibility when those bands are shifted or 
widened. If that happens in response to a speculative attack against the upper limit 
of the band,  the credibility in the anti-inflationary commitment of the Central 
Bank is also damaged. It is interesting that currency bands in Chile and Colombia 
disappeared almost simultaneously, in September 1999, when there were strong 
pressures towards depreciation. However, the simultaneity in the dismantling of 
currency bands may also say a lot about IMF preferences and fashions in the 
international financial community.  
(v)  The floating regime introduced in Chile and Colombia after dismantling the 
currency bands does not imply absence of central bank intervention.
11 What they 
have in common is the assumption that the central bank cannot target specific 
levels of neither the nominal nor the real exchange rates. Still, central banks have 
some room to alter the short-term foreign exchange market through their 
interventions, which in turn may be discretionary or follow publicly known rules. 
While Chile has exerted discretion in intervening the market, Colombia is 
following strict rules since 1999. In any case, the experiences of both countries 
show that the optimal exchange rate policy is far from leaving the exchange rate 






                                           
11 Colombia accumulated US$ 2.2 billion since it entered the floating regime. Chile accumulated reserves in 2000 
and 2002 but lost US$ 600 million in 2001 and US$ 400 million in 2003 (table 5).  
12 Ffrench-Davis (2003, p.12). See also Edwards (2002), who argues that “it is perfectly possible that the optimal 
policy (…) is one where the central bank intervenes from time to time” (p.17). Those interventions, also, may be 





3. Capital account regulations 
 
a)  The rationale for capital account regulations 
 
The rationale for capital account regulations arises from the hypothesis that full 
liberalization of the capital account in a developing economy, is likely to ‘trap’ domestic policies 
into short-term bias and non-sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium (Ffrench-Davis and 
Ocampo, 2001).  
 
  The exchange rate regimes of Chile and Colombia provide a clear example of the 
difficulties created by foreign capital flows to macroeconomic policies. Capital flows greatly 
reduce the autonomy of domestic economic authorities to jointly manage the real exchange rate, 
the real interest rate, and aggregate demand, even in the short and medium run. Large capital 
inflows tend to reduce both the exchange rate and the interest rate, and to increase aggregate 
demand, while capital outflows tend to increase both macro-prices and to reduce economic 
activity. As far as capital flows to developing economies have been proved to be highly pro-
cyclical, the real exchange rate, the real interest rate and aggregate demand become highly pro-
cyclical too. 
 
As a general rule, the capital account regulations that have been used both in Chile and in 
Colombia are oriented to:   
 
(i)  Enhance the ability of monetary and exchange rate policies to act in a counter-
cyclical way. When capital inflows are very large, they push the domestic demand 
into a boom and lead to a deficit in the current account. Under those 
circumstances, the capital account regulations are addressed to discourage capital 
inflows in order to mitigate pressures towards lower real interest rates -which 
would artificially reinforce the aggregate demand boom- and towards a real 
appreciation- which would increase the current account deficit. 
(ii)  Reduce the vulnerability of the domestic economy to sudden changes in the 
international financial environment. This explains the emphasis of those 
regulations in reducing the share of short-term and liquid liabilities in total capital 
flows, and in imposing limits on the net uncovered foreign exchange positions of 
the domestic economic agents. 
(iii)  Improve the capacity of a country to use foreign savings as complementary to 
domestic savings and not as substitute. Again, this explains the emphasis of those 
regulations in reducing the share of short-term capital, which tends to finance 
consumption,  vis-à-vis long-term capital, which usually finances productive 
investment. 
  
b)  Reserve requirement on capital inflows: A price-based capital account regulation 
 
The most famous mechanism of capital account regulation used in both Chile and 
Colombia during the 1990s is the reserve requirement on capital inflows. As we will see, the 
height of the requirement and several details of its operation changed along time and were 





important characteristics: (i) they were not quantitative controls but price-based regulations, (ii) 
they affected capital inflows and not capital outflows, and (iii) they were designed to have more 
impact on short-term than on long-term capital flows. 
 
As any price-based mechanism, the reserve requirement on capital inflows was not 
intended to block the way for those inflows, but to discourage them at the margin, placing sand 
on their wheels. In order to make capital inflows more costly under a large external supply, two 
key elements were present as complements to the reserve requirement: (i) restrictive policies on 
any type of dollarization of deposits in the domestic financial system, and (ii) strict prudential 
regulations on the net foreign exchange position allowed to financial intermediaries. These two 
elements together guaranteed that the domestic financial intermediaries could provide foreign 
exchange denominated loans only when they were funded with foreign credit and subject to the 
reserve requirement. At the same time they inhibited the domestic financial system from 
becoming a major actor in the speculation in favor or against the peso.  
 
  The introduction of a non-remunerated reserve requirement in Chile in June 1991 was 
explicitly addressed to soften appreciatory pressures and provide more breath and autonomy to 
monetary policy (Zahler, 1998, p.69). The deposit of the reserve requirement was initially 
equivalent to 20% of foreign loans and had to be kept for a minimum of 90 days and a maximum 
of one year, according to the term of the operation. In order to increase its effect, in May 1992, it 
was raised to 30% and the term of the deposit was raised to one year, independent of the maturity 
of the loan, which increased the bias against short-term capital inflows. In July 1995 it was 
extended to the purchase of Chilean stocks (secondary ADRs) by foreigners. 
 
Although the objective of regulating capital flows continued to be present in Chile after 
1996, the attitude of policy-makers was much less pro-active. Despite the fact that there was a 
significant surge of capital inflows in 1996 and 1997, the authorities did not accommodate the 
height of the reserve requirement to the increased supply of funding. The surge clearly weakened 
the fundamentals of the Chilean economy: the current account deficit increased, the exchange 
rate appreciated much faster and the stock of liquid foreign liabilities grew. When the Asian 
crisis contagion arrived, therefore, these fundamentals of the Chilean economy were much 
weaker than they had been during the tequila crisis of 1995. This fact contributed to increase the 
magnitude of the crisis of 1998 and 1999 when, as we will see, private capital outflows were 
quite large, including funds of the domestic private pension system (see Zahler, 2004). The 
reserve requirement was reduced from 30% to 10% in June 1998 and then to 0 percent in 
September.  
 
Inspired by the Chilean experience, the Colombian reserve requirement on capital inflows 
was decreed in September 1993, coinciding with the final steps of the process of dismantling 
administrative capital controls that had started in 1991. The size of the reserve requirement was 
high enough to make it prohibitive in practice. Exemption made for trade financing, the 
requirement applied to any “short-term” foreign loan. “Short-term” was initially defined as less 
than 18-month maturity: this term was raised in March and August of 1994 to three and five 
years, respectively.
13 In 1996, when the exchange rate was at the most depreciated limit of the 
                                           





currency band and the central bank was loosing reserves, the minimum maturity of the foreign 
loans to be exempted from the reserve requirement went down to three years.  
 
After the huge increase in international reserves that took place in the last part of 1996, 
the Colombian government issued a State-of-Emergency Decree, which, among other measures, 
established an explicit Tobin tax on all capital inflows (trade financing included) in addition to 
the reserve requirement regulated by the central bank. The Decree was declared unconstitutional 
in March 1997 but the central bank rapidly increased the reserve requirement again. 
 
In May 1997, the Colombian central bank introduced several changes in the reserve 
requirement system, making it simpler and more similar to the Chilean one. A flat deposit in 
local currency (instead of a dollar denominated deposit) was required for all loans, independently 
of the maturity. The minimum maturity was thus abandoned but, as in the Chilean case, the new 
mechanism implied that the tax equivalent of the deposit was lower the longer the maturity of the 
corresponding loan. Initially, the size of the reserve requirement was 30% of the foreign loan and 
had to be kept during 18 months. These numbers were reduced in January and again in 
September 1998 as a response to the weakened capital inflows. Between September 1998 and 
May 2000, the reserve requirement was only 10% of the foreign loan and had to be kept during 6 
months. In June 2000, the reserve requirement was reduced to zero. Colombian authorities 
stated, however, as had done the authorities in Chile, that this was not the end of the mechanism, 
but only a resetting of the parameters, and the mechanism could be used again if needed to 
confront renewed capital surges.   
 
Besides the similarities among the Chilean and the Colombian reserve requirement 
instruments to deter capital inflows, it seems clear that Chile used them more proactively during 
the first half of the 1990s than after 1995. In contrast, Colombia used them more proactively in 
the second half of the decade.   
 
c)  Non-FDI private capital flows and the effectiveness of private capital account regulations  
 
The behavior of non-FDI private capital flows shows significant common elements in 
Chile and Colombia (see table 5, column e). Those flows were highly positive for several years 
until 1997 and became highly negative in both countries during the crisis of 1998/99.  
 
In Chile, these flows averaged US$ 2.4 billion yearly between 1990 and 1996 and did not 
have extreme swings during that period. Even in 1995, when the tequila crisis was taking place, 
they amounted to US$ 2.0 billion. In contrast, between 1998 and 1999 they implied a net outflow 
of US$ 8.4 billion. Capital outflows had a pause in 2000 but were high again since 2001. 
 
In Colombia, private non-FDI capital inflows became important only after 1992. During 
the initial years of the decade, net capital flows were negative, reflecting perhaps the existence of 
direct controls which were more effective to discourage inflows than to restrain outflows. As 
already mentioned, those controls were dismantled between 1991 and 1993. Private non-FDI 
capital flows averaged US$ 2.7 billion per year between 1993 and 1996. As in Chile, they were 
high even in 1995, when they amounted to US$ 2.5 billion, despite the tequila crisis. The 





of the reserve requirement implemented at the beginning of that year, before the Asian crisis 
started. In 1998 they became very small but still positive, and starting in 1999 they turned highly 
negative. 
 
Based on these figures, it appears easy to doubt the effectiveness of the reserve 
requirement that was used to regulate capital inflows. Both in Chile and in Colombia, net capital 
inflows were highest precisely during the periods in which that regulation was being used. 
However, the coexistence of large capital inflows and the reserve requirement may reflect a 
policy reaction function in which the introduction of capital regulations is caused by the large 
supply of capital inflows.





In any case, it is clear that the regulations on capital inflows used in Chile and Colombia 
were not able to avoid the large net capital outflows that took place in the final years of the 
1990s and the beginning of the new century. Our hypothesis may be summarized as follows: the 
                                           
14 Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998) successfully test this hypothesis for the Brazilian case.  
b.  International 
Reserves 
Accumulation
c. Net Direct 
Foreign Investment
d. Net Foreign 
Credit to Public 
Sector 
1
e. Other Flows of 
Private Capital  = 
b - a - c - d  
US$ Millions Shares of GDP
A.  CHILE
1990 -485 -1.5% 2,121 654 -222.0 2,174
1991 -99 -0.3% 1,049 697 -955.1 1,406
1992 -958 -2.2% 2,344 538 42.2 2,723
1993 -2,553 -5.4% 173 600 -357.0 2,483
1994 -1,585 -2.9% 2,919 1,672 -313.8 3,146
1995 -1,345 -1.9% 741 2,205 -2,085.5 1,967
1996 -3,083 -4.1% 1,122 3,681 -1,540.3 2,064
1997 -3,660 -4.4% 3,320 3,809 -125.7 3,297
1998 -3,918 -4.9% -2,194 3,144 430.0 -1,850
1999 99 0.1% -738 6,203 429.0 -7,469
2000 -897 -1.2% 337 873 -85.3 446
2001 -1,100 -1.6% -596 2,590 481.1 -2,567
2002 -885 -1.3% 199 1,594 886.2 -1,397
2003 -594 -0.8% -366 1,587 1,859 -3,218
B. COLOMBIA
1990 544 1.2% 610 484 -45 -373
1991 2,347 4.9% 1,763 437 -347 -675
1992 876 1.5% 1,274 745 -56 -292
1993 -2,221 -3.4% 464 865 -158 1,978
1994 -3,669 -4.5% 199 1,298 -1,224 3,795
1995 -4,524 -4.9% 2 712 1,388 2,425
1996 -4,642 -4.8% 1,721 2,784 856 2,723
1997 -5,751 -5.4% 277 4,753 1,146 129
1998 -4,858 -4.9% -1,390 2,032 1,469 -34
1999 671 0.8% -315 1,392 647 -3,025
2000 628 0.9% 870 2,069 614 -2,441
2001 -1,250 -1.5% 1,217 2,509 1,484 -1,525
2002 p -1,580 -1.8% 138 1,258 388 73
2003 p -1,389 -1.8% -184 837 469 -101
p/ Preliminary
CHILE AND COLOMBIA:  CAPITAL FLOWS AND CURRENT ACCOUNT FINANCING, 1990-2003
(US$ Millions)
TABLE  5
1/ Chile: Includes Central Bank's operations and excludes operations by the state-owned commercial bank (Banco del Estado). Colombia: Corresponds
to the net loans to public sector plus the net investment in bonds issued by the public sector.
Source: Central Bank of Chile,IMF, Banco de la República.





reserve requirement was useful and effective as a temporary policy tool during the boom of 
capital inflows. Its effectiveness may be seen from two different perspectives. First, as a short-
run macroeconomic policy, it enhanced the ability of the domestic authorities to act in a counter-
cyclical way and to deal with the trade-offs between exchange rate and monetary policies. 
Second, as a liability-flows policy, it was effective in reducing the short-term component of 
capital inflows. Thus, the reserve requirement enhanced the absorptive capacity of a given total 
inflow, by raising the share of funds more associated to productive investment and, 
consequently, reduced the vulnerability to sudden stops; by contributing to resist appreciating 
pressures on the exchange rate, it contributed to increase the share of tradables in GDP.  
 
On the other hand, however, the reserve requirement and, more generally, the set of 
policies adopted by Chile and Colombia, were not fully effective to deal with a major and lasting 
crisis as the one observed after 1997. This is not a reason to discard the temporary use of this 
type of policies under new capital surges, but to stress the need of other complementary 
regulations. The experiences of Chile and Colombia since 1998 highlight the need for more strict 
controls on the behavior of the stocks of foreign-exchange denominated assets and liabilities. For 
example, as we will argue later, there should be financial regulations addressed to discourage 
large currency mismatches in the balance sheets of firms in the non-tradable sectors. Also, there 
should be regulations on the ability of institutional investors to manage portfolios in foreign 
currency. Opening the way for outflows of domestic capital in periods of abundance proved to be 
ineffective in reducing the excess supply, while in periods of scarcity of external supply led to an 
extremely pro-cyclical outcome.
15 In the Colombian case, it is clear that the large growing fiscal 
imbalances that took place since the mid-1990s implied a rapid increase in foreign exchange 
liabilities and made it much more difficult to manage the crisis.  
 
d)  The reserve requirement as a macroeconomic policy tool 
 
In evaluating the effectiveness of the reserve requirement on capital inflows as a 
macroeconomic policy tool, most analysts have focused on the effects of this regulation on the 
volume of total capital inflows. Empirical results on this topic are mixed. 
  
Some econometric studies for both Chile and Colombia failed to find effects of the 
reserve requirement on the total volume of capital inflows, even though they found an effect on 
the composition of flows.
16 Those studies argue that there is a high substitution between capital 
inflows of different maturities which implies a compensatory increase in long-term inflows when 
the reserve requirement induces a reduction in the short-term ones. From there, they conclude 
that this type of price-based regulation on capital inflows does not have any macroeconomic 
impact.  
 
Other recent studies, however, obtain very different results. Le Fort and Lehman (2003) 
show that, in the Chilean case, the reserve requirement did have an effect on the total volume of 
private capital inflows, once the effects of interest rate differentials and the evolution of the 
                                           
15 It is interesting to underline that Korea, assumed to be at present a case of open capital account (evidently, it was 
the opposite in its period of 'miraculous' growth) still applies restrictions on outflows of domestic savings. 
16 For the Chilean case, critical evaluations are developed in Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998); De Gregorio, Edwards 





supply of funds are well taken into account. Similarly, Ocampo and Tovar (2003) find that the 
reserve requirements in Colombia “were effective in reducing the volume of capital inflows, both 
due to the increased costs of short-term borrowing and to the discrete effects of regulations, 
associated to the imperfect substitution of borrowing at different maturities” (p. 29). 
  
Villar and Rincón (2003) argue that the econometric results on the effectiveness of this 
type of regulation on the volume of capital inflows do not solve the simultaneity problem that 
arises from the fact that those regulations affect the domestic interest rates, which in turn affect 
capital inflows. The papers mentioned in the previous paragraphs obtain partial equilibrium 
results: given the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates, a tax on capital inflows 
reduces their volume. The tax, however, should increase the domestic interest rate and it is likely 
that its total effect on the volume of capital inflows will be ambiguous when this channel is taken 
into account. 
 
Following Villar and Rincón, the effectiveness of the reserve requirement as a 
macroeconomic policy tool should be evaluated also from the perspective of its impact on the 
domestic interest rates and the real exchange rate. Their econometric work show indeed that, in 
Colombia, the reserve requirement was a useful macroeconomic policy tool in a period 
characterized by large capital inflows, excess aggregate demand, pressures towards domestic 
currency appreciation and large current account deficits. This tool facilitated a counter-cyclical 
policy, allowing the domestic authorities to increase the domestic interest rates vis-à-vis the 
foreign rate, and hence reducing aggregate demand while avoiding additional pressures towards 
domestic currency appreciation.  
 
Chile, in 1992 offers one quite illustrative case of the contribution of the reserve 
requirement to macroeconomic stability. Then, the USA, with a rather low interest rate, was 
further reducing it in order to face domestic recession, while Chile experienced some overheating 
and large supply of external funds. The response of Chile was to increase the reserve 
requirement, thus making space for monetary policy to raise its domestic interest rate with net 
stabilizing effects on aggregate demand. 
 
We can conclude, therefore, that the reserve requirement was a useful macroeconomic 
policy tool. However, as any other macroeconomic policy addressed to affect interest rates and 
the exchange rate, it is essentially a short-term policy instrument,
17 and to be used only in periods 
of an 'excessive' supply. It is a counter-cyclical policy tool.  
 
e)  The reserve requirement as a liability policy: Flows policies vs. stock policies 
 
Empirical studies in both Chile and Colombia coincide in showing that the reserve 
requirement on capital inflows contributed to keep a relatively long maturity of private foreign 
liabilities in the 1990s.
18 From this point of view, this was an effective tool as a liability policy. 
                                           
17 As already discussed, the "short-term", in this respect, can refer to several years, associated to the extent of the 
capital surge. 
18 For the Colombian case, see Cárdenas and Barrera (1997); Ocampo and Tovar (2003). For the Chilean case, see 
Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (2001); De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000); Le Fort and Lehman (2003); Schmidt-





With a long-term maturity of foreign debt stock, a sudden stop in the supply of capital flows 
towards emerging markets has a much lesser impact on those markets as far as the refinancing 
needs are lower. In those conjunctures, what matters are gross financing needs rather than net 
needs. When the tequila crisis spread over most Latin-American countries in 1995, the maturity 
structure of foreign debt in Chile and Colombia was perceived as a significant strength of these 
economies and helped to make them almost immune to the crisis.  
  
However, a high average maturity of private foreign debt is not a sufficient safeguard 
against a strong and long-lived shortfall in the supply of inflows. The experiences of Chile and 
Colombia in 1998-99 suggest that, when the economy receives that type of shock, what was 
originally contracted to be long-term debt may become shorter-term debt by the decision of 
debtors. They, indeed, buy dollar-denominated assets to hedge their positions. Also, under the 
pressure of weak economic activity and expectations of devaluation, they may be allowed to 
prepay their foreign currency liabilities before maturity, as actually happened in Colombia.
19 
 
Table 6 presents the evolution of the stocks of foreign debt in Chile and Colombia. The 
figures help to highlight the very rapid increase in the private sector foreign debt that took place 
during the second half of the 1990s, though from moderate initial levels. The rapid process of 
private debt accumulation marked a deep contrast between the period of the tequila crisis and the 
1998-99 crises. At the end of 1994, when the tequila crisis was starting, total private debt was 
US$ 12 billion in Chile and US$ 8 billion in Colombia. Only four years later, at the end of 1998, 
these numbers had more than doubled (to US$27 billion in Chile and to US$18 billion in 
Colombia). Although the short-term component of these debts continued to be low, the huge 
increase in total private debt surely made the foreign exchange balance sheet much more 
vulnerable to the crisis. 
 
Behind the behavior of private foreign debt during the 1990s there is a rapidly growing 
currency mismatch in the private sector balance sheets. Both firms and households increased 
their foreign exchange denominated liabilities without a corresponding increase in foreign 
exchange denominated assets. Households and firms producing in the non-tradable sectors 
became highly indebted in foreign currency during the period in which the peso was expected to 
appreciate, which suggests that the reserve requirement on capital inflows was not binding 
enough. Only when the crisis of 1998-99 exploded and the Chilean and the Colombian peso 
started to depreciate, the private sectors started to look eagerly for hedging instruments, which 
reinforced the pressures towards depreciating the domestic currencies. The regulations in both 
Chile and Colombia were not strong enough to discourage the financial intermediaries passing 
currency mismatches through to their clients. As a consequence, when the peso actually 
depreciated, they had to pay a significant cost. In the Colombian experience, to some degree, the 
financial crisis of 1999 was explained by the sudden increase in the peso value of foreign 
liabilities due to the peso depreciation. Prudential regulation should have prevented this from 
happening by reflecting these risks in the balance sheets of the banks that used to lend to clients 
with this type of currency mismatch.
 In the case of Chile, the devaluation that was needed, 
because of the too appreciated exchange rate reached in 1996-97, was delayed thus giving time 
                                           
19 Since 1997, the Banco de la República of Colombia allowed private debtors to prepay long-term liabilities (which 
had not deposited the reserve requirement on short-term capital inflows), provided that half of the original maturity 





to private firms to reduce foreign debt with cheap dollars, at the expense of the Central Bank 
balance sheet and a costly monetary contraction. 
 
 
One main problem with the regulations that were used in Chile and Colombia is that they 
act on the flow of new foreign exchange liabilities and not on the stock of liabilities. Thus, 
liability-flows policies should be complemented with liability-stock policies. These stock policies 
should be primarily based on prudential regulation and supervision, imposing very stringent 
regulatory provisions to the banks lending to households and firms with large foreign currency 
mismatches (Villar and Rincón, 2003).
20 In addition, as suggested in Ocampo (2003), they could 
be reinforced with tax provisions applying to foreign currency liabilities. For instance, 
deductions for interest payments on international loans could be restricted to firms with foreign 
exchange revenues. 
                                           
20 Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo (2001) argue that the main problem with this option is that non-financial agents may 








End Of: Short term 
2 Long Term
A.  CHILE
1990 1,398 4,235 11,792 17,425 6,710
1991 1,135 4,675 10,554 16,364 7,638
1992 3,027 5,592 9,623 18,242 9,742
1993 2,999 7,167 9,020 19,186 10,252
1994 3,339 9,004 9,135 21,478 13,740
1995 2,816 11,419 7,501 21,736 14,783
1996 2,823 17,438 6,011 26,272 15,805
1997 1,438 22,126 5,470 29,034 18,274
1998 1,712 25,087 5,792 32,591 16,292
1999 1,198 27,571 5,989 34,758 14,946
2000 2,694 28,464 6,019 37,177 15,110
2001 2,051 30,363 6,124 38,538 14,400
2002 2,324 31,154 7,478 40,956 15,351
2003 3,710 30,391 9,227 43,328 15,851
B. COLOMBIA
1990 1,409 1,113 15,471 17,993 4,595
1991 1,184 981 15,171 17,335 6,500
1992 1,612 1,250 14,416 17,278 7,728
1993 2,587 2,046 14,254 18,887 7,932
1994 3,213 4,806 14,718 22,737 8,104
1995 3,920 6,880 15,540 26,340 8,453
1996 3,151 11,572 16,394 31,116 9,939
1997 3,436 14,191 16,785 34,412 9,908
1998 3,002 14,891 18,787 36,680 8,740
1999 2,267 14,267 20,199 36,733 8,103
2000 2,315 13,207 20,610 36,132 9,006
2001 2,802 12,838 23,471 39,111 10,245
2002 p 3,063 11,492 22,785 37,340 10,844
2003 p 3,210 10,455 24,531 38,197 10,921
p/ Preliminary
2/  Refers to transactions originally contracted for one year or less
CHILE AND COLOMBIA:  INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND DEBT STOCKS, 1990-2003    (US$ Millions)
TABLE 6
1/  Colombia: Includes financial leasing transactions. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Banco de la República.





f)  Foreign portfolio investment 
 
While foreign direct investment (FDI) was entirely free in both Chile and Colombia since 
the beginning of the 1990s,
21 these countries maintained restrictions on foreign portfolio 
investment as a complementary policy to the reserve requirement on foreign loans. 
  
Chile kept a one-year minimum stay for foreign portfolio investment (except ADRs) up 
to May 2000. Also, as already mentioned, since 1995 the reserve requirement was applied to the 
purchase of Chilean stocks by foreigners (secondary ADRs). Still, foreign portfolio investment in 
equity played a very pro-cyclical role, as can be seen in table 7. Colombia applied a less 
restrictive regulation. ADRs were not subject to the reserve requirement on capital inflows and 
foreign investment in equity was freely allowed, provided that it was done through special 
purpose funds administered by financial institutions with residence in Colombia. Moreover, in 
order to accelerate the process of deepening the domestic capital markets for public debt, 
Colombia facilitated foreign investment in fixed interest securities in 1996. This purpose was 
certainly met during 1996 and 1997, before the crisis exploded. The stock of foreign investment 
in domestic public debt went from zero in 1995 to US$400 million by March 1998. Less than 
one year later, however, this amount had gone back to almost zero. Therefore, foreign portfolio 
investment in public securities, which was liberalized in order to facilitate public financing, 
reinforced the pro-cyclicality of foreign investment in equity. 
 
 
                                           
21 In the Chilean case, however, there was a one-year minimum stay before capital repatriation of FDI was allowed 
and loans associated to FDI were subject to the reserve requirement. 













2002 p -320 17
2003 p 312 -52
p/ Preliminary
1/ ADRs and Investment Funds
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Banco de la República.
TABLE 7
CHILE AND COLOMBIA:  NET FLOWS OF FOREIGN 







g)  The role of domestic institutional investors in the foreign exchange markets 
 
The stronger impact that the crisis of the final years of the 1990s had on the Chilean and 
the Colombian economies, compared with the impact of the tequila crisis, may be explained in 
part by factors already mentioned: the more appreciated exchange rates, the stronger and longer 
reduction in the supply of funds, the higher stock of debt and the higher exposure to volatile 
portfolio investment. An additional relevant factor may have been the role that major domestic 
institutional investors started to play in the foreign exchange markets during the second half of 
the 1990s. 
 
Initially, the restrictions on the activity of domestic institutional investors in the foreign 
exchange markets were an essential part of the policy framework in which Chile and Colombia 
introduced the reserve requirement on capital inflows. However, the trend towards financial 
liberalization that dominated the international economy in the 1990s implied that some of these 
restrictions were gradually relaxed in the second half of the decade. This relaxation made it more 
difficult to avoid sudden capital outflows and portfolio reallocations as the ones that took place 
between 1997 and 1999, when the Asian and the Russian crises exploded. The effectiveness of 
the reserve requirement on capital inflows to reduce the financial vulnerability was therefore 
diminished by such relaxation. 
 
The clearest example of this process of relaxation was related with the investment regime 
applied to the private pension funds. These funds became very important actors in the domestic 
capital markets in both countries. Paradoxically, their role in the foreign exchange markets was 
promoted during the second half of the 1990s, when the authorities in both Chile and Colombia 
considered that the effects of foreign capital inflows could be partly compensated by capital 
outflows originated by these institutional investors. They were then allowed to invest larger 
shares of their portfolios in foreign currency, expecting that they would play a counter-cyclical 
role. In practice, however, the role of these funds was highly pro-cyclical. They did not invest 
much abroad during the period prior to the Asian crisis, in which there were expectations of 
domestic currency appreciation. Instead, after the crisis exploded, they took advantage of their 
more relaxed regulation in order to rapidly reallocate huge amounts of their portfolios abroad, 
thus reinforcing the demand for foreign currency and the pressures towards depreciation. 
 
Hence, as argued in Ffrench-Davis and Tapia (2001), the attempt to use a more relaxed 
regulation on the pension funds proved not to be successful in order to encourage capital 
outflows during the boom. On the contrary, that attempt induced a higher degree of vulnerability 
of the foreign exchange markets and a reduction in the degrees of freedom of domestic monetary 
policies during the downturn (see also Ocampo, 2003; Zahler, 2004). Actually, the main source 
of the recessive adjustment experienced by Chile in 1998-99 was associated to capital outflows 
by the private social security agents; their net outflow was equivalent to nearly 5% of GDP. 
 
h)  Public capital flows and FDI 
 
As mentioned in section 1, the behavior of fiscal accounts in the 1990s was entirely 
different in Chile and Colombia. Chile kept an average fiscal surplus of nearly 2% of GDP. 





decade. This implied that public financing was not an issue in Chile, while it certainly was in 
Colombia.  
 
Table 5 (above) highlights the contrast between Chile and Colombia on this matter. Until 
1994, both countries could use their fiscal surpluses counter-cyclically, reducing their public 
external debt in a period of large private capital inflows. In the Chilean case, this continued to be 
true in the following years. Most notably, in the biennium 1995-96, net public foreign borrowing 
was negative in US$ 3.6 billion, partially countervailing private inflows.  
 
In Colombia, in contrast, there were net inflows of foreign credit to the public sector 
since 1995. Due to the size of the public sector deficit in Colombia, those flows became quite 
large, averaging US$ 1.1 billion between 1995 and 2001. Between 1995 and 1997, those flows 
acted pro-cyclically, reinforcing the pressures created by private capital inflows towards the 
appreciation of the Colombian peso.
22 
 
The impact of the Colombian fiscal deficit on capital flows did not only show up through 
foreign credit to the public sector. We already mentioned that foreign portfolio investment in 
Colombia was closely linked with the development of a public debt market, which in turn was 
urgently needed to finance the government deficit. In addition, the behavior and the 
characteristics of FDI in Colombia were largely influenced by the size of that deficit. This 
implied an important contrast with Chile. 
 
Net flows of FDI were higher in Chile than in Colombia. The yearly averages between 
1990 and 2003 were US$ 2.1 billion and US$ 1.6 billion, respectively (table 5). The difference 
between the two countries in terms of FDI in greenfield projects was even larger than suggested 
by these figures, which implies that the contribution of FDI to increase domestic capital 
formation and productivity was much higher in Chile. Indeed, until 1998, there was a clear 
positive relationship between FDI and gross capital formation in that country. Such relationship 
was lost in 1999, when most FDI became related to mergers and acquisitions (see Ffrench-Davis, 
2002, p. 15). Still, it is interesting to notice that FDI played a counter-cyclical role in Chile in 
1999 as compared to other private capital flows.  
 
In contrast with Chile, FDI in Colombia corresponded mostly to privatizations and to 
investment in the oil sector. This implied that its relationship with domestic capital formation in 
the country was extremely week and that FDI played a pro-cyclical role. The period in which 
FDI was highest -1996 through 1998, according to table 5-, corresponds with a rapidly declining 
ratio of capital formation as a whole (see table 3). Actually, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
accounted for 58% of total gross FDI in that period (UNCTAD, 2002). A large part of FDI in 
Colombia was in practice an instrument of public deficit financing. This source of financing 
                                           
22 Paradoxically, after 1997 net inflows of foreign credit to the public sector behaved again as stabilizers of total 
foreign financing. They, indeed, help to explain the fact that in 1998 the reduction in international reserves was 
much smaller, and that in the following years the recovery of those reserves was much faster in Colombia than in 
Chile. In that sense, the existence of larger fiscal deficits in Colombia, provided that they were financed abroad, 






almost disappeared after 1998. Also, the natural cycle of investment in the Cusiana oil well 
implied a rapid decline of that source of FDI after 1998. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Chile and Colombia seemed to have done things right when the tequila crisis arrived in 1995, as 
far as they kept growing and had no signs of financial distress. After the Asian and the Russian 
crises, however, both Chile and Colombia were heavily affected. Does this mean that the capital 
account regulations that these countries had in place did not work? Was this the result of a badly 
designed exchange rate regime? Of course, any single answer to these questions would be 
extremely simplistic. From the analysis above we can extract the following conclusions: 
 
(i)  The type of capital account regulations that were used both in Chile and Colombia 
did work successfully in reducing the share of the short-term component of total 
capital inflows. 
(ii)  Also, they allowed monetary policy to increase the domestic interest rates relative 
to foreign interest rates, without strengthening the pressure to overvalue the 
domestic currencies. This was a positive outcome in the period of the boom of 
capital inflows, as far as it allowed monetary policy to behave countercyclically, 
and contributed to more sustainable real macroeconomic balances.  
(iii)  Some liberalization of the rules applied to both foreign portfolio investment and 
investment of domestic institutional investors in foreign securities, during the 
second half of the 1990s, created a more pro-cyclical environment for the 
management of the crisis of 1998-99. 
(iv)  The comparison between the Chilean and Colombian experiences illustrates the 
importance of fiscal austerity in periods of large capital inflows. The ability of 
governments to undertake counter-cyclical fiscal policies critically depends on 
what they do during the boom periods. The government can partially outweigh the 
effects of private capital inflows by reducing –counter-cyclically- its public debt 
during booms, as Chile actually did until 1997. Also, if there is a developed 
market for domestic public debt, substitution of domestic debt for foreign debt 
may be a good mechanism to reduce pressures towards appreciation in periods of 
large capital inflows.  
(v)  Still, what Chile suffered in the crisis of 1998-99 shows that fiscal restraint is not 
enough and that private capital flows (particularly of outflows of domestic capital 
in that biennium) may introduce too much vulnerability, even in presence of 
capital controls. In fact, the capital account regulations on inflows used in Chile 
and Colombia were not enough to avoid that critical risk. Even with a low 
exposure to short-term debt, capital outflows may be very large when the 
domestic residents are able to invest abroad and long-term debtors can pre-pay 
their liabilities. This vulnerability may be mitigated with controls on the net 
foreign exchange position of the financial intermediaries, of the main institutional 
investors (like private pension funds) and of households and firms. Prudential 
regulation of the financial sector should require banks to reflect the risks that are 





between their assets and their liabilities. Those mismatches could also be 
discouraged through tax provisions. 
(vi)  The exchange rate management may have played a role in aggravating the effects 
of the reversal in capital flows that took place in 1998-99. The exchange rate 
bands that were in place in Chile and Colombia were useful arrangements along 
most of the 1990s. The crawling bands, however, were more efficient to deal with 
pressures towards currency appreciation than with pressures towards currency 
depreciation. The credibility problems that were created by the bands led the 
authorities to restrict the exchange rate flexibility and to undertake very 
contractionary monetary policies during the crisis. The lack of exchange rate 
flexibility during the crisis was much more evident in Chile than in Colombia.      
(vii)  During the 1990s, the experiences of Chile and Colombia with domestic credit 
were entirely different. In Colombia, the impact of foreign capital flows was 
leveraged by domestic credit, thus reinforcing their pro-cyclical behavior. In 
Chile, the index of domestic credit/GDP behaved in a counter-cyclical way. Two 
lessons arise from these contrasting experiences. First, that a higher degree of 
financial depth and a stricter financial supervision may work as buffers against the 
shocks of foreign capital flows, as probably did in Chile. Second, that domestic 
financial regulation should not reinforce the pro-cyclical behavior of capital 
inflows, as actually happened in Colombia with the reduction of reserve 
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